Reference is drawn to missives by Clement RoheeOct 8) and Emile Mervin (Oct 9) on Cheddi Jagan relating to October 5, 1992 (the election that led to the return of democratic governance in Guyana, the first free and fair election after independence in 1966, after some 26 years of oppressive dictatorial rule). Rohee claims that Jagan was responsible for Oct 5, 1992 (meaning having democratic elections) while Mervin argues that it was Jagan who was also responsible for the creation of Burnham’s dictatorship – namely that it was Jagan’s introduction of communist ideology that allowed Burnham, with silence from Washington, to establish the totalitarian state. Washington closed its eyes on Burnham’s abuses just to keep Jagan out because he posed a greater threat to American interests than Burnham. Both Rohee and Mervin are right – Jagan did introduce communism (socialism) in Guyana that Washington viewed as a threat to its national interests, and Jagan was also deeply involved in the local and international struggle for the restoration of democratic governance and free and fair elections, which came about, Mervin eloquently stated, as a result of the collapse of communism in USSR and America demanding FFE in Guyana.
Unless one studies and understands US foreign policy, as Mervin grasps, one would not understand Washington’s policy towards Guyana and the region. US would never allow communism (socialism in its various forms), in the west, certainly not in its backyard in British Guiana or independent Guyana. So many socialist governments have been toppled from 1954 thru 2026 (Maduro). Jagan did not understand this American mission, and he naively introduced and promoted socialism in Br. Guiana when he returned from his studies in USA in 1943. Communism would lead to his downfall. He spoke a language that was inimical to the interests of America. President Eisenhower was concerned about the rise of Jagan, and he discussed the threat of communism posed by Jagan and the PPP with Prime Minister Churchill. The PPP government was removed from office by Churchill in 1953, long before the rise of Cuba and long before Arbenz was toppled in Guatemala in 1954.
Foreign forces created a division in the PPP that would split into two factions – one led by Jagan and the other by Burnham in 1954. When elections were held in 1957, Jagan won. Burnham renamed his faction on October 5, 1957 as PNC. The rise of Fidel Castro in Cuba in 1959 created additional concerns for Washington especially that Castro professed communism which was embraced by Jagan. A socialist fraternity developed between Castro and Jagan reorienting towards the Soviet bloc, raising worries in Washington and London. Jagan won re-election in 1961. His open praise for Marxist-Leninist doctrines and his warm stance toward the Soviet Union and Fidel Castro’s Cuba alarmed officials in Washington. President Kennedy hosted him at the White House, and he tried to convince the President that he was a Fabian socialist. American policymakers don’t distinguish between different brand of socialism. Jagan refused to tone down his communist rhetoric or distance himself from socialist regimes, convincing Kennedy and key advisers — including CIA Director Allen Dulles — that Jagan was an ideological hardliner who posed an unacceptable threat to American interests in the region.
Anyone who understands US foreign policy would know that Washington has been governed by a singular, rigid objective: preventing another “second Cuba”. In British Guiana (now Guyana), this preoccupation led Washington directly into a web of covert intervention, political manipulation, and a long-standing tolerance for electoral fraud. Jagan’s government was destabilized (1962-64) and eventually engineered out of office by the US and UK and replaced by Burnham. Washington and London described Burnham as opportunistic but viewed him as a lesser threat to the West than Jagan. America closed its eyes to Burnham rigging to keep out Jagan.
Jagan’s ideological convictions alienated American policymakers, ultimately paving the way for nearly three decades of totalitarian rule under Burnham. A handful of us went to countless fundraisers and events of members of Congress entreating them to take actions on Guyana on rights violations. Lobbying efforts of Congress (Thomas Downey, Robert Mrazek, Raymond McGrath, Joseph Addabbo, Patrick Moynihan, Al D’Amato, among others) and Presidents Carter and Reagan by a handful of us in USA were rebuffed. After the formation of GOPIO in August 1989, at which Jagan was a special guest, the executives repeatedly appealed to Members of Congress and President Bush on our behalf for free and fair elections in Guyana; GOPIO also allowed us to engage Members of Congress and the Bush Administration at its many programs. There were pushbacks to our lobbying efforts and pleas as Members of Congress and the Bush Administration made clear they were not favorable to the idea of replacing a corrupt administration aligned with Washington’s objectives with an avowed communist; Bush had served as Director of CIA and was familiar with Jagan. We persisted with our lobbying efforts with the assistance of GOPIO, hosting fundraisers for Members of Congress (Addabbo, Solarz, among others and joining their election campaigns) hoping to convince them to pressure Hoyte on human rights violations and pursuing political reforms. A change in Washington’s attitude towards Guyana came about after the collapse of communism and the friendship and trust that developed between Gorbachev and Bush. An agreement was reached between Washington and Moscow that America would help secure free and fair elections in Guyana and Russia would help to facilitate FFE in Nicaragua. Hoyte lost to Jagan in Guyana and the Sandinistas lost to Chamorro in Nicaragua. Initially, pressured by Greene, Corbin and other strongmen in the PNC, Hoyte refused to concede defeat. A stern phone call from Washington changed his mind not dissimilar to the stern phone call that came to Granger in 2020 to accept the outcome of the peoples’ verdict. If communism was not a defining aspect of Jagan’s politics, dictatorial rule would not have emerged and there would not have been the need for all the struggles in the diaspora and in Guyana that led to October 5, 1992.
The legacy of totalitarian rule in Guyana remains a striking case study of Cold War foreign policy, how two superpowers competed for influence in the thirds world, illustrating how ideological rigidity led the US to compromise democratic principles, destabilize foreign nations, and sustain dictatorship regimes in the name of strategic containment. When communism was no longer a threat, democracy was restored.
