President Irfaan Ali of Guyana and Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar of Trinidad and Tobago are founding members of President Trump’s Shield of Americas. In accepting membership, they help to augment security in their countries and in the region in addition to bolstering ties with USA.
President Trump and leaders of a group of Latin American and Caribbean countries gathered in Miami on March 7, 2026 to discuss regional security. Hosted by Trump, the inaugural Shield of the Americas summit was presented principally as a response to drug cartels, transnational organized crime and the growing security challenges confronting the US and countries across the greater region. Twelve Latin American and Caribbean leaders were willing attendees at the Miami meeting, including President Ali and PM Kamla Persad Bissessar of Trinidad and Tobago. Since then, the initiative has developed into a broader regional framework not only to combat the threat posed by narco-traffickers but also geo-strategic matters and trade. The Shield is complementary, in terms of bilateral alliances geared towards assistance and to the OAS-centered multilateral forums, such as the Summit of the Americas. The Shield enhances geo security. The members support the aggressive, military-first approach of Trump to combat transnational organized crime.
There was a follow up meeting by the leaders of the group of 14 on September 22 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Prime Minister Kamla Persad Bissessar and President Irfaan Ali of Guyana were there to promote common interests as they also were in Miami.
The Shield of Americas is essentially a strategic, formal partnership consisting of member states to combat narco trafficking in the region. Narco-trafficking has posed a significant threat to national security of the US and the greater region. The Shield is a security framework, serving as a central pillar of cooperation aimed at eradicating the production and importation of narco drugs and trafficking in the region. It is formal diplomatic treaty operating as a functional web of bilateral regional cooperation against drug trafficking. The security architecture has so far been based on US-centered bilateral military alliances and partnerships. But a guiding assumption is that regional security and fighting drug trafficking can be further secured by preserving the hegemonic position of the United States (“US primacy”).
According to official statements, the main purpose of the Shield is to intensify cooperation with the US rather than with each other in combating drug trafficking. The members of the Shield hardly work with or trade or cooperate with each other on any matter except their support for USA and President Trump who has been supportive of them. Cooperation among each other is the next logical step and could happen soon. Coordinating their efforts, the members offer a collective front that no single nation could project alone, providing a public good to the region such as tracking illegal fishing, narco, and improving disaster response which builds diplomatic goodwill.
Thus far, the Shield is issue specific although its overarching goal includes maritime security and China which has posed a challenge to US hegemony in the region. It is not forgotten that the US accuses China of exporting illicit drugs to the region and into the US. China is on the minds of Washington policy makers. China’s economic threat to USA makes its presence in the region a security policy challenge. It is not a secret that Washington seeks to limit China’s influence while combating narco-trafficking and narco-terrorism.
In this context, this multi-nation regional alliance cooperating with Washington is important. Expansion of bilateral partnerships with willing states, underpinned by increasing anti-drug and economic cooperation, and limiting China’s influence are worthy objectives. But success will largely depend on the resources Washington is willing to provide the individual nation to combat drug trafficking in their respective territories and to limit the economic presence of China.
In recent years, it has become apparent that the security policies of Guyana and T&T coincides with USA – varying slightly, depending on the global political situation and as well as the constellation of which party in power. UNC and PPP seem willing to cooperate with Washington; others seem less willing and paid a price in elections. T&T and Guyana should be natural allies of the US given the large diaspora presence in America and the desire of every Trini and Guyanese to obtain a visa to visit or lives in USA. And given the security threat from Venezuela, both should have bilateral military alliances with Washington and their presence in Guyana and T&T. Irfaan and Kamla have been have acted wisely in supporting US strategies on regional security; both should enter into defense relationships with Washington and deepen cooperation. All nations (CARICOM and OAS) and all political parties and leaders (government and opposition) ought to be concerned about the effects of drugs on people as well as on the economy and support the Shield. The Shield enhances security under US military might.
States have different perspectives on joining the alliance. But they all want American resources, soft loans, financial aid, intelligence to combat threats, including illegal maritime activities, securing sea lanes, expanding fair trade, etc. The Shield can provide satellite data on vessel movements with information cross-checked against ship automatic identification systems (AIS). Illegal ships can be located and apprehended. It is a win for member nations.
One problem with the Shield is it is “leaderless” and lacks a permanent secretariat or a joint military command structure, it risks functioning more as a high-level talking shop than a reliable security guarantor. And Washington has not delivered on funding. President Trump should address these issues.
